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Executive Summary
Robin Leichenko and Karen O‘Brien have proposed ―double exposure‖ as a conceptual
framework to demonstrate how processes of globalization and global environmental change
(GEC) redefine risk and encourage new, interrelated responses to social and ecological
transitions (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2000; Leichenko and O'Brien, 2008). In particular, the
concept encourages researchers and policy makers to consider interplay between global climate
change and globalization and how this is expressed unevenly across space. After reviewing the
ways double exposure has been used in the literature, we consider four case studies to investigate
the utility of the framework for analyzing and understanding climate change adaptation and
mitigation in the Americas. Our case studies include (1) dengue and malaria outbreaks in
Jamaica, (2) agriculture in the Argentinean drylands, (3) hydroelectric production in
northwestern Panama, and (4) climate change mitigation through carbon offsets at a regional
level in Latin America. We agree with O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) that double exposure can
be used to highlight at multiple scales the so-called ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ created by current
global transitions and thus we seek to apply the framework to research in new arenas.
Double exposure brings focus to human-environmental interactions. This attention could
be, and often is, recognized without the use of the double exposure framework, but the use of this
heuristic devise is particularly compelling in that it encourages contemplation about ways in
which uneven development advantages some groups and individuals at the expense of others. For
example, those that benefit from globalization and climate change economics can often be
conceptually paired with those that are made more vulnerable, as we demonstrate in the
agricultural and energy sectors. In addition, double exposure helps demonstrate the interrelation
of development trade-offs, as we also exhibit through case study analysis. In our conclusion, to
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encourage on-going engagement with double exposure as a research lens, we (1) identify
potential limitations of the existing framework, (2) recommend complementary bodies of
literature, and (3) discuss ethical implications of our research findings.

Introduction
In identifying, measuring, and reporting on vulnerability, we strive to consider multiple,
interconnected factors that influence how and why humans are affected differently by natural
hazards and climate change. Institutional, economic, social, and cultural conditions are important
determinants of adaptive capacity, but each set of variables is highly complex (Trainor, Calef,
Natcher, Chapin, McGuire, Huntington, Duffy, Rupp, DeWilde, Kwart, Fresco, & Lovecraft,
2009). The double exposure framework has been presented by O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000,
2009) as one way to bridge our concern for equity in a connected world while sensitizing our
analysis to nuanced, interwoven factors. The concept refers to instances where global
environmental change couples with globalization to influence social, economic, and ecological
processes in compound, multi-directional, and potentially unexpected ways. While the specific
benefits and costs to winners and losers in Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) multiply as a result of
the interactions among variables, there is seldom a blanket response. Ecological processes create
uneven impacts, but social responses are also varied. Studies show that some places and some
people are better able to take advantage of opportunities (Eakin and Lemos, 2006). Others are
disproportionately vulnerable to climate-related events (Parks and Roberts, 2006; Ribot, 2010) or
poverty resulting from global economic integration (Olmos, 2001; Thorbecke and Nissanke,
2006). In many instances, social processes serve to amplify negative repercussions for
marginalized populations rather than to reduce them.
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It is timely to engage in research pertaining to globalization and climate change given ongoing policy discussions. Nearly all scientists accept evidence demonstrating human-induced
climate change (IPCC, 2007). Strong general agreement among climate scientists continues to be
affirmed in independent studies designed to evaluate scientific consensus (see, for example,
Gillis, 2010). Nonetheless, the disappointing international climate negotiations in Copenhagen
in 2009 and the continued failure of policy makers in the United States to enact national climate
policy demonstrates challenges to enacting public policies to respond to shared challenges
(Krosnick, 2010; Rahm, 2010). In climate programs and policy, whether locally, nationally, or
internationally designed and implemented, issues of social justice and determining shared
responsibility must remain forefront. For this reason, we argue double exposure analysis
provides an important tool to inform policy debates. We demonstrate this utility through the
analysis of social and environmental justice within four Latin America case studies.
We argue, similar to O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008), that equity and connectivity
are central elements to applications of double exposure. With these factors in mind, to what
extent can double exposure be used to identify, explain, and report on climate change mitigation
and adaptation in the Americas? We seek to answer this question by first reviewing the existing
literature on double exposure and then testing the applicability of this research lens through
analysis of four case studies. Our conclusion presents findings on the utility and limitations of
double exposure for understanding dynamic, multi-scale, human-environment interactions.

Double Exposure: A Literature Review
It is increasingly accepted that ―single-stressor-single outcome‖ approaches to studying
vulnerability fail to capture the reality of most systems (Eakin and Luers, 2006). Indeed, the
influence of global economic, cultural, political, and environmental processes on the production
5

and management of risks in local contexts is widely accepted (Eakin, 2005). Climate change is
widely recognized as a ―risk multiplier,‖ increasing the impact of a variety of risks not directly
related to global environmental change (Christoplos, 2010). Likewise, Eakin (2005) argues
―delineating the linkages between economic globalization, market liberalization, and
environmental change at different scales is an essential task in vulnerability analysis‖ (p. 1923).
Yet empirical analysis of this multiplication process is lacking. Some quantitative studies have
attempted to identify and map the overlap of social and environmental vulnerability indicators
(see Cutter (2010) for specific examples), but many cases have yet to be verified through
qualitative methods. The challenge to understanding vulnerability is to identify how economic
and environmental processes interact in particular places and times, and then how these
interactions, in turn, shape the impacts of global change processes while simultaneously driving
others (Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010).
In 2000, O‘Brien and Leichenko introduced double exposure as a framework for
considering the impacts of climate change and globalization. Starting with the assumption that
climate change and globalization will impact regions, sectors, social groups and ecosystems
differently, double exposure provides a means to identify the winners and losers from these
processes. For example, consider the case of Brazil. Economic globalization and currency
devaluation impacted the livelihoods of residents who lived in favelas (shantytowns).
Simultaneously, these urban poor are also among the groups most vulnerable to climatic change
since hillsides are prone to mudslides and flooding, which may increase in both frequency and
magnitude with global environmental change (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2000). Increasing
temperatures and heavy rains also may increase the risk of malaria and cholera outbreaks. This
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example demonstrates how double exposure captures the connections of economic globalization
and climate change for a social group in a specific locale.
O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) argue that double exposure has two important
dimensions that animate the framework: equity and connectivity. The equity dimension
highlights that not all individuals, communities, regions, and nations will be equally affected by
climate change. In turn, the connectivity dimension emphasizes that the security of individuals
and communities is increasingly linked to those of others across space and time. Acknowledging
that outcomes for one group of people are often related to outcomes for other groups orients our
focus. Together, equity and connectivity make double exposure a people-based approach to
understanding climate change.
Double exposure is more than a simple acknowledgement that vulnerability to climate
change is influenced by multiple processes of global change. Double exposure argues that
changing economic and social policies influence the capacity to cope with and adapt to climate
change (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2007/2008). For example, a farmer may have an appropriate
adaptation to climate change (e.g., crop rotation or diversification) that ends up being poorly
compensated due to the demands of global markets. Although some places, sectors, and social
groups experience higher levels of exposure, it is important to note that vulnerability is not
limited to developing countries. For example, elderly populations in the United States may be at
risk for death during heat waves, particularly those living on fixed incomes.

Applications and Uses
Double exposure has been used in a variety of different ways. O‘Brien et al. (2009)
invoke it as a theory that explains how the two global processes result in increases in inequalities
and vulnerabilities and reduce resilience. More often, however, double exposure is not treated as
7

a theory. Instead, it is used as a framework or concept to label multiple exposures. For example,
Egende-Nissen and Venema (2009) point to double feedback loops in the Arctic using the term
double exposure.
In the Arctic context, the double exposures are in double feedback: loss of Arctic ice
from global warming leads to decreased albedo; and more warming and more ice loss in
the Arctic, which, as noted earlier, plays a critical role in global climate regulation. Arctic
policy feedback then amplifies the biophysical feedback: loss of ice allows more fossil
fuel exploitation and more global warming (Egende-Nissen and Venema, 2009, p. 6).
Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe (2010) use the concept in a similar manner but are careful to point out
that double exposures are different from multiple exposures as a general term.
Double exposure is more than just the fact of multiple processes happening in the same
place at the same time. It is rather that the processes interact and, in doing so, influence
the exposure and capacity of people and places to respond to a wide array of stressors and
shocks in a way that creates new contexts for experiencing and responding to change.
Pathways to increased vulnerability (or enhanced resilience) are multidirectional, so that
socioeconomic conditions may mediate the impacts of environmental change, but
changing environmental conditions may also alter socioeconomic capacities to maintain
particular livelihood strategies (p. 9).
Following the use of double exposure as a concept, sometimes it is simply used as a noun to
describe the ―double exposure‖ due to globalization and climate change (e.g., Eakin, 2005;
Malone, 2002).
Christoplos (2010) argues that double exposure is best treated as a heuristic device that can
be used to highlight the overlaps between globalization and climate change.
Awareness of double exposures has been important as a heuristic device for drawing
attention to the social, political and economic forces related to both the causes and the
effects of climate change. It has highlighted that both global environmental change and
globalisation are highly ―transformative‖ in that profound changes are underway. There
will be new ―winners and losers‖ as some vulnerabilities will be reduced and others
exacerbated due to the interplay between these two sets of factors (Leichenko and
O‘Brien, 2008, p. 8).
Much of the research using double exposure has focused on agriculture (e.g. Eakin, 2005;
McGuigan, Reynolds & Wiedmer, 2002; Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010). It has also been used in
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research evaluating geoengineering efforts in the Arctic (Egende-Nissen and Venema, 2009) and
water scarity (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2008). O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) apply double
exposure to examples in various contexts, but similar breadth of application has not yet been
demonstrated broadly in scholarly research.

Four Case Study Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean
The literature review suggests broad applicability of double exposure, although it has
generally been applied to cases of agriculture and climate change adaptation. We offer four cases
studies that help test the scope and utility of double exposure. Our cases were chosen to include
diverse factors, including new sectors (health care and energy) and a range of scales (regional,
national, and transnational). Moreover, we wanted to explore whether double exposures could be
used to examine climate change mitigation efforts in addition to adaptation and vulnerability.
Following Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008), we employ the approach of using double
exposure to identify winners and losers. We must express an overall concern is with the
terminology ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘ While it gets a key point across effectively, the identification
of disadvantaged or marginalized population as ‗losers‘ is potentially offensive. There is usually
a negative slant associated with being a called a loser that we are certain Robin Leichenko and
Karen O‘Brien did not intend, and we do not wish to imply this stigma with our application of
their terminology.
Our first case study focuses on the potential of dengue fever outbreaks in Jamaica,
applying double exposure to the health sector on a national level to highlight ‗double losers‘ that
are more susceptible to disease due to the combined impacts of globalization and climate change.
The second case study focuses on agricultural production in the Mendoza region of Argentina,
pointing to the ways in which certain farmers have more options for climate change adaptation
9

while farmers that have already been hurt by wealth concentration due to globalization are more
vulnerable to climate change. The third case focuses on the energy sector in the region of Bocas
del Toro, Panama where a proposed dam project designed to mitigate the impacts of climate
change contributes to the violation of Indigenous Peoples‘ rights. Finally, the fourth case
considers the ‗double winners‘ from mitigation windfalls from transnational carbon trading. At
the same time, the analysis also points to inequities within the current and proposed trading
systems that perpetuate existing disparities between social groups, nations, and regions.

Case Study One: Double Exposures in the Jamaican Health Sector
As indicated previously, O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) advanced the concept of ‗double
exposure‘ in which the two global processes of climate change and globalization will result in a
set of ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘ They have expressed the view that although the concept may be
especially important in situations where the negative consequences of climate change and global
environmental change are highly likely to be experienced, the ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ resulting
from the interaction of the two processes may be different from the set of ‗winners‘ and ‗losers,‘
which are identified when each of the two processes is examined independently. Development is
clearly an uneven process, but some trends are evident. For example, in some instances, regional
disparities in levels of economic development are accentuated by the process of globalization,
including neoliberal reforms such as structural adjustment programs, as well as by climate
change. These interactions are clearly occurring in Jamaica.
Although it is widely accepted that globalization and global environmental change will
have significant impacts on human health and on the health sector in general, the concept of
double exposure has never really been used to a large extent to highlight some of these
implications for the health sector. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the applicability
10

of double exposure for exploring vulnerability with specific reference to the Jamaican health
sector and the threat of increased dengue fever incidence.

Background
Retrospective analysis of the climatic data by the Climate Studies Group, Mona (CSGM)
at the University of the West Indies showed that the Caribbean region experienced a warming
trend during the past two decades (Peterson, Taylor, Demeritte, Duncombe, Burton, Thompson,
Porter, Mercedes, Villegas, Semexant Fils, Klien Tank, Martis, Warner, Joyette, Mills,
Alexander, and Gleason, 2002). A similar upward trend was noted for a number of rainfall
indices also calculated for the Caribbean over the past four decades. Results from CSGM have
also established an association between climate change and the occurrence of dengue fever
outbreaks in the Caribbean. Peaks in occurrences are associated with warmer conditions, and the
seasonality of the epidemics suggests that temperature and precipitation have some explanatory
value. A prospective study is under way, but preliminary results indicate a continuation of the
warming trend. Caribbean islands, therefore, should brace themselves for increasing outbreaks of
a disease, which is debilitating, and which, in its dengue hemorrhagic manifestations, can cause
loss of life.

Results: Jamaican Health Care Study
One in-depth study conducted recently in Jamaica has shown that a substantial number of
people living in conditions that are conducive to the proliferation of the vector and virus are
vulnerable (Heslop-Thomas, Bailey, Amarakoon, Chen, Rawlins, Chadee, Crosbourne, Owino,
Polson, Rhoden, Stennett and Taylor, 2008). It has demonstrated the vulnerability of those living
in informal settlements. State data reveal that 25 percent of the population, approximately
11

675,000 people, lives in squatter settlements (Ministry of Environment and Housing, 2009a,
2009b). It is clear that Jamaica faces a problem of great magnitude. Beset with competing urgent
claims (e.g., HIV/AIDS transmission, rising sea level, extreme poverty, organized crime, etc.),
the country does not see preparation for the possibility of a large outbreak of dengue as a
priority. If an epidemic occurs, state agencies do not have the capacity to contain exposure.
Not unexpectedly, the poor are the most vulnerable. In 2009, 10 percent of the population
of the island lived below the poverty line, and this is expected to increase. In addition, poverty is
more prevalent in rural areas (PIOJ/STATIN, 2009); these communities, which account for
roughly 48 percent of the population, are more vulnerable. Contrary to popular belief, the poor
are not necessarily unemployed. In fact, many of the poor work as domestic workers and earn the
minimum wage.
There is merit to the view of the Ministry of Health that communities must take some
responsibility for vector control. But this has to be a policy position rather than a defensive
posture. As policy, calls for community responsibility must be supported by initiatives aimed at
empowering communities to assume control. Public education is necessary to address the
knowledge gap revealed in the study (Heslop-Thomas et al, 2008). More than a half of those
interviewed in communities could not say what causes the disease, and the overwhelming
majority had no knowledge of its symptoms. Vulnerable groups, therefore, do not have the tools
to protect themselves from dengue outbreaks.
Despite calls for community responsibility, responsibility is shared. The government’s
responsibility is clearly outlined by WHO (1997). One area needing government intervention is
with the risk associated with improper water storage. Many rural areas do not have access to
pipe-borne water while squatter communities in urban areas are not, by law, to have a pipe-borne
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supply. The problem of water has to be tackled on two fronts—the provision of low-cost, secure
drums, and the granting of security of tenure to those who, because of their status, are denied
access to running water.
There are public sector organizations that have been given the mandate to mitigate
hazards in the island and to promote sustainable development. These organizations seem focused
almost completely on threats posed by sea level rise. No one can deny the threat posed by this
phenomenon to small islands that have their most valuable assets and most of their people on low
coastal plains. This is a more attractive, more seductive area of focus than a health threat,
especially when the disease is known. Nonetheless, not all of the public sector agencies should
become so absorbed with the gradual encroaching of the sea to the exclusion of more imminent
threats. They should be persuaded to broaden their concept of a hazard; to realize that the threat
of an increase in the occurrence of a debilitating and possibly deadly disease is not incompatible
with their mandate; to see threats to health as threats to sustainable development and include
these issues in their public education programs. The Jamaican Ministry of Health, by itself, is in
no position to meet the challenge of increased disease transmission in the island. There is need
for a concerted effort of collaboration with various public and private sector environmental
organizations. These are elements in the country‘s generic capacity which constitute the
foundation for adaptation.

Conclusion: Double Exposure in Jamaican Health Care
The concept of ‗double exposure‘ can be used to highlight the double whammy in so far
as vulnerability to dengue fever in Jamaica is concerned. Here is a country that has been hit by
globalization and deteriorating macro and micro economic conditions. As it is trying to grapple
with these issues, its coping strategies will now need to include dealing with an imminent threat
13

of dengue epidemics. A large non-immune population with less than adequate knowledge about
the disease and its transmission, and a Ministry of Health which cannot address these issues due
to resource constraints are good examples of two forces working to the detriment of a peoplewho may now be categorized rightly by this concept as ‗double losers.‘

Case Study Two: Double Exposure in Agricultural Production in the Argentinean
Drylands
In central western Argentina, the Mendoza River follows a quite spread out pattern in the
Central Andes: it originates in the snow-crested mountain range and flows toward the lower
plains, providing water for the irrigation oases developed on the foothills. This scheme develops
in two opposed landscapes: on the one hand, a green oasis is lined with neat rows of grapevines,
tree-bordered roads and streets, and irrigation channels and drains. This is the powerful oasis
where human work celebrates having conquered a hostile nature. On the other hand, nonirrigated lands are a "no-man's land" and subordinate spaces perceived as being empty and void
of interest. Whereas the oasis concentrates the dynamism of the one million inhabitants of
Mendoza city and an export viticulture-based economy, the scattered population of non-irrigated
lands barely survives on out-of-market economic activities, devastated by poverty and
desertification processes (Montaña, Torres, Abraham, Torres, & Pastor, 2005).
Under this light, the communities developed in the eastern foothills of the central Andes
could be considered as modern hydraulic societies in which the social tissue is strongly
associated with a comprehensive and intensive water resource manipulation within an order
imposed for controlling a hostile environment (Worster, 1985). As power distributions are
associated to water management, water would have the capacity to express -and also modelhegemonic and subordinate social relations of a hierarchical system.
14

As links between water and community are very high in these areas, global
environmental change (GEC) and water scarcity deepening scenarios could cause not only spatial
changes but also affect social processes while also influencing the existing nature-society
relationships. As in other dry lands of South America, in the Mendoza river basin water is a
restricting factor for human settlement and agriculture. The intensive viticulture and horticulture
are only possible if tied to water management, making use of surface water distributed by the
irrigation network or pumping groundwater. But climate also imposes its conditions, as freezing
and hail annually cause crop losses and warming vineyards need cold temperatures for reaching
proper maturity.
Global environmental change scenarios (2020-2030) for the Mendoza River basin are
similar to other rivers originating in the central Andes (Boninsegna and Villalba, 2007). They
forecast a rise of 1.5°C in the mean temperature, a diminishing of precipitations over 100
millimeters, and a 150 meter rising of the 0°C isotherm, reducing the snow accumulation. As a
result of these changes, the volume of flow of the Mendoza River is expected to diminish
between 7 and 13%. The hydrograph of this nival regime river would also be affected. The peak
discharge would be advanced one month, increasing spring flows (October and November) and
lowering the summer outflows (January to March). This poses threats to agricultural and
livestock activities already restricted by water scarcity, affecting farmers but also the entire
agricultural-based regional economy.

Farmers facing global environmental change
Research has focused on the situations to be faced by farmers in three representative
productive systems of the basin. Two of them are agricultural activities developed within the
oasis irrigation system: one permanent (viticulture) and the other annual (horticulture, mostly
15

olericulture). The third, goat husbandry, is an extensive livestock activity taking place mainly for
subsistence purposes in non-irrigated areas upstream and especially at the tail of the basin.
For these productive systems, vulnerability to global environmental change appears to be
related to different factors:
A. Nature of the productive system: Oasis agriculture vs. non-irrigated extensive goat husbandry
A first analysis must differentiate between the agricultural systems (viticulture and
horticulture) relying on irrigation from extensive goat husbandry developed in non-irrigated
zones. Diminishing precipitation will not affect the first but will decrease the natural vegetation
of the desert, affecting goat husbandry and deepening the desertification processes already in
place. Drought periods hit very hard on this activity, testing its survival limits and compromising
alimentary security of its domestic production units. The extreme poverty of this population
could raise a paradoxical situation around vulnerability. The benefits of goat husbandry are so
scarce that the incomes of these domestic production units must be complemented with others
coming from temporary agricultural or urban activities and State subsidies. Thus, these producers
would be more diversified than those devoted exclusively to agriculture and would be more
likely to adopt a wider range of adaptive strategies. Leaving theoretical arguments aside, their
extreme poverty is closely related to their vulnerability and reduces resilience, not only for
facing climate change but in general terms.
The diminishing river runoff will be harder on agricultural farmers who rely on the
surface irrigation network. In the context of a system that allocates water proportionally to the
plot surface (independently from the land being used or the type of crop), viticulture farmers will
be favored over horticulture producers because of the vineyards lower water consumption and
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more resistance to water stress. On the other hand, the annual cycle of horticulture makes
adaptive strategies such as moving to better locations in terms of climate and water risks easier.
Agricultural farmers will see adaptation to hydrogram alterations facilitated by the
operation of the dams regulating the rivers. But ecological flows are not being considered in the
dams operation, so the river regulation for favoring water consumptions in the oasis prevents
water surplus from reaching the tail of the basin where the desert communities are receiving less
and less water as the rural and urban oasis upstream continues its development. This subordinate
position in the hydraulic society explains a good deal of the vulnerabilities of desert
communities.
The nature of the productive system has appeared a crucial factor of the vulnerability, but
the analysis gives evidence that this ―nature‖ has strong social components not related to climate,
and exposures are also leading to poverty and social power issues.
(B) Structure of the productive chain and the farmer’s position in it
Mendoza‘s river basin horticulture is an agricultural mosaic formed by a great number of
heterogeneous producers. The distribution channels are also varied in the context of a loosely
regulated sector in which the informal economy is significant. The complicated and unstable
decision-making processes horticultural farmers face does not encourage investments for
reducing exposures. This structure also creates hurdles for implementation of institutional
measures that could help the most disadvantaged producers face GEC scenarios.
In contrast, viticulture shows a clear structure with horizontal and vertical integrations
and regulations set by formal institutional arrangements. Adaptive measures could be fostered
here not only from the state but also by existing farmers‘ organizations. But, as integrated and
organized as this structure is, the farmers‘ universe is quite polarized between the producers that
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make wine and are directly involved in the wine export circuit and those small and medium
farmers whose participation in the chain remains subordinate. Are state institutions potentially
co-opted by the more powerful agents? This takes us to our next key factor.
(C) Farmer typology
Farmers‘ typology (―big/small,‖ ―capital intensive/traditional,‖ ―export/domestic,‖ or any
other construct showing power differences) is directly related to vulnerability, in goat husbandry
as well as in the oasis agricultural systems. Economic wealth of big farmers allows them to
overcome reduced surface water allocations by pumping groundwater. In the context of loosely
regulated groundwater management, they can even become independent from the ―democratic‖
but tedious water users organization mechanisms and just turn on the pump whenever it fits their
irrigation needs, obtaining water volumes only restricted by affordable (and subsidized) energy
prices. In the same way, they have a better position to adopt other vulnerability reducing
measures such as pressurized irrigation to make a more efficient water use or hail net protection.
Unlike the more disadvantaged farmers, they can move to better locations, an adaptive strategy
that is currently being seen not only in horticulture farmers that rent the land for their annual
crops but also in big winemakers buying land and building wineries in upstream foothill
locations.
(D) Location in the basin
Finally, position in the basin appeared to be a vulnerability factor more related to natural
explanations but also related with the social, economical and governance factors mentioned
above. The more successful agricultural farmers (especially those integrated to the export sector)
gradually climb the foothills to settle in the upper oasis lands, looking for lower temperatures,
better standard of water rights (less likely to be cut back in a drought situation), better water
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quality, and less pollution, in some cases pushing the agricultural border upstream by means of
groundwater pumping. These are capital-intensive properties relatively protected against climate
and water risks. On the other hand, those farmers whose benefits are not enough for affording
those prime locations must resign themselves to the less attractive traditional oasis locations with
fewer resources to reduce their exposure and to work out adaptive strategies. These farmers will
be in greater need of institutional support to cope with the expected effects of GEC.

Double exposures, multiple exposures
In these basins, farmers‘ vulnerability depends upon the nature of their activity, as some
of them are more water and climate sensitive to GEC scenarios than others. Beyond that, there
are some other factors also affecting farmers‘ vulnerability (exposure and adaptive capacities)
within the same productive system. Some of these factors seem to be related to power
relationships and to equity issues of these hydraulic societies. Being wealthy and successful in
the wine and food markets, having access to technology (irrigation and others), being vertically
and horizontally integrated, and being favored by the use of the better and more expensive
upstream lands turns out to be shielding factors and indicators of a broader availability of
adaptive resources.
Factors and mechanisms that could make farmers more or less vulnerable in GEC
scenarios have shown a significant similarity to those who explain their performance while
facing the new challenges of the globalized agrifood markets during the 1990s. At that time, the
weakest producers, those who couldn‘t keep pace with the new rules of the game, were
negatively affected, even pushed out of business, while a concentration process took place in
favor of the more powerful agents. It seems that GEC effects will affect farmers in centralwestern Argentina in an analogous way, this time adding its effects to the ones already produced
19

by globalization. Here is where double exposures are found, equity issues are raised and the
process could be explained with reference to ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘

Case Study Three: Double Exposure in the Energy Sector in Bocas del Toro, Panama
The Bocas del Toro Province in northwestern Panama provides an illustrative example of
double exposure in the energy sector at a sub-national scale. News reports demonstrate
widespread public discontent in the province over the lack of basic services and human rights
violations. State-sponsored mistreatment and intimidation of Bocas del Toro indigenous groups
is evident in media coverage (Arcía, 2009a, 2009b; La Prensa, 2010). Press reports and
testimonies from local indigenous inhabitants suggest violence was used to quell local opposition
to foreign-sponsored large-scale dams being constructed on Naso and Ngӧbe lands (Brannan
Jaén, 2008; Jordán, I. M., 2008; Jordán, O., 2008; IAHCR, 2009, pers. comm., June 7, 2009).
AES-Changuinola, a subsidiary of the US-based energy giant AES Corp, is rapidly
developing Chan 75, a $560 million and 222 megawatt dam in Bocas del Toro. Chan 75
construction requires relocation of Ngӧbe villages and has created the context for authoritative
control of impacted populations (i.e., with fences, police checkpoints, travel restrictions, etc.)
(Jordán, O., 2008; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). After visiting the area, the United Nations
(UN) Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous Peoples determined that free and informed consent did not occur before the hydro
concession was allocated (Anaya, 2009). Local populations have since attempted to halt the
dam‘s construction with petitions, testimony, and court cases in front of the Organization of
American State (OAS) human rights agencies.
Chan 75 hydroelectric project shifted resource management power away from local
populations and toward the private sector (Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). AES20

Changuinola‘s contract with the Panama‘s National Environmental Authority (ANAM)
transitioned responsibility for 6,000 hectares of public lands in the Palo Seco Forest Reserve to
the private firm. The state decided local village populations would be permitted to remain near
their original settlements within the forest reserve, but they would not receive title to their lands
even though villages pre-date the creation of the protected area. Palo Seco was created in 1983
with the specific objective of safeguarding water resources for hydroelectric production
(Paiemont, 2007).
AES-Changuinola and ANAM officials frequently reiterate the importance of forest
cover to maintain efficient functioning of Chan 75 dam. State and company officials are planning
agroforestry and tourism initiatives to redirect local production toward economic activities
identified as conducive with hydroelectric energy generation and carbon sales from forested
areas surrounding the dam (Blanco, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). Watershed
management for electricity production and emission offsets is being valued above subsistence
agriculture and fishing in local communities and as a result profound restructuring of indigenous
communities is occurring. According to village leaders, neighboring Naso indigenous
communities face a similar situation (pers. comm., June 7, 2009). Construction of the Bonyic
dam with multinational investment moves forward in spite of Naso petitions in front of
international human rights tribunals aiming to stop the project. Since initiation, Chan 75 and
Bonyic dams have been promoted as clean energy projects providing greenhouse gas emission
reductions.
Dam construction creates double exposure for local populations because climate change
has intensified the need to protect the watershed. Simultaneously global climate change has
reinforced the need for a global transition to clean energy sources, and, in particular, to find
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replacements for fossil fuels. While the transition to renewable energy is imperative, it does not
justify authoritarianism. Since sustainable development requires participatory and inclusive
processes (Chandani, 2007; Burkett, 2008; Comin, 2008), analysis of dam building in
northwestern Panama suggest the importance of paying attention to not only the end product of
climate change mitigation and electricity production, but also the means to arrive at that goal.
The double exposure framework is clearly broad and inclusive enough to include studies
of the energy sector. The benefit of applying double exposure is that it demonstrates that those
who profit and those who are harmed are impacted differently by the exact same electricity
source. This connection is often ignored. While private developers suggest the dams will reduce
vulnerability for Panamanian society by producing reliable and affordable energy, most energy
will fed to the national grid and be sent to urban and industrial zones. Ironically, rural
populations paying the highest social and ecological costs near large-scale dam sites often do not
have access to basic services such as electricity (McCully, 2001).
Negative impacts identified in double exposure research (such as in O‘Brien and
Leichenko, 2000; O‘Brien et al., 2004; Leichenko and O‘Brien 2008) can frequently be
identified as development trade-offs. In the case of Bocas del Toro, given pressing concerns
about human rights violations, should potential vulnerabilities be ranked or somehow weighed
against one another? Does double exposure help us understand how to value factors as diverse as
renewable energy promotion, clean water, biodiversity, human rights, land rights, or selfdetermination when trade-offs are being proposed between them? For example, Chan 75 dam has
been also criticized by international scientists because of probable negative impacts for
biodiversity within internationally recognized protected areas located nearby, including La
Amistad World Heritage Site (McLarney and Mafla, 2007). Due to the breadth of the framework,
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double exposure may not be sufficiently attentive to each factor involved and it does not inform
us about the relative importance of each element. To be fair, this remains a limitation in much
social science research. Double exposure‘s central benefit to climate change policy analysis is
that it reminds researchers to connect interrelated human-environment transitions in ways that
are often overlooked, but individual researchers still need to decide how to interpret the
importance of each factor.
The energy sector in Bocas del Toro exhibits a development dilemma with ethical
underpinnings. Who defines community resilience, and whose definition matters? In the case of
Chan 75, the project administrator suggests the local communities will benefit from relocated and
restructured villages (pers. comm., June 8, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). Can
resilience be augmented by outsiders? Does it matter if customary practices are lost? A
complaint of Bocas del Toro Indigenous Peoples is that there has been extensive tinkering with
self-governance and local institutions on the part of the Panamanian state and private developers
(Jordan, O., 2008; Anaya 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Communities have been torn
apart not only by resettlement but also by intimidation of dam opponents. Moreover, impacted
Ngӧbe testified in front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that the state
influenced the selection of local leaders, and thus subsequent negotiations in 2009 affirming the
project were essentially staged events lacking broad participation (IAHCR, 2009). A Ngӧbe
leader acknowledged that state agencies often work to erode the authority of communal leaders
in the province and actively promote and knowingly recognize self-appointed individuals
without the support of their people, as a means to usurp power from legitimate leaders (pers.
comm., May 2, 2010). Outside intervention in local institutions has been profoundly disruptive to
community cohesion in Naso and Ngӧbe territories (Paiemont, 2007; Jordan, O., 2008; Anaya
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2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010) and is in violation of self-determination as outlined in
the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an international norm that
Panama supported. State agencies and private sector actors seek to assure their ability to control
natural resource extraction and use, but their actions may promulgate new forms of vulnerability.
Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) address cultural loss as one factor within double exposure, but
implications for diverse ethnic and racial groups may be overshadowed by the large number of
other variables simultaneously under consideration.

Case Study Four: Mitigation Windfalls in Latin America
This section examines recently established and emerging greenhouse gas (GHG)
mitigation schemes to assess interrelated feedback from globalization and climate change leading
to windfall profits. Groups benefiting from GHG mitigation would likely be identified as ‗double
winners,‘ in the sense of Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008), since many gained their advantageous
economic position from investments in the global economy prior to becoming involved in carbon
markets. There has been little scholarly research on those who have profited from adaptation or
mitigation programs, but see Lohmann (2005, 2008), Bumpus and Liverman (2008), Haigh
(2008), and Hazlewood (2010) for a few examples. Given data limitations, we discuss social and
environmental justice issues emerging in the climate change mitigation literature, with a focus on
Latin America. Although global trends are evident in adaptation and mitigation, it is always
necessary to be aware of regional and local differences (Leichenko and O‘Brien, 2008; Eakin
and Lemos, 2006).
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The Rise of Emission Trading
Emission trading has grown exponentially since the mid-2000s under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), the European Union‘s Emission Trading System (EU-ETS),
and other frameworks (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Brohé, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009; Giddens,
2009; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; World Bank, 2010). Figures
from the World Bank show more than tenfold growth in the carbon market exchanges in the past
five years and record the value traded in 2009 as $144 billion dollars. A Global Business
Intelligence report highlights how the global carbon market grew at compound annual growth
rate of 89% to reach its 2009 level. There is considerable additional growth predicted: carbon
credits linked to a reduction of even ten percent of global deforestation should be worth billions
of dollars (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008). It is important to note that the price of carbon is still
relatively low, usually under $15 dollars per ton. World Bank economists believe $50 dollar per
ton is a more realistic estimate of true value (pers. comm., July 16, 2010).
There is a long list of economic sectors that benefit from carbon markets and a very short
list of academic papers on the topic. In many instances carbon trade has emerged from a
specialized branch of existing operations, but there has also been the creation of whole new
entities (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). The social and environmental impact standards and
assessment tools used by each company vary greatly. Research on carbon brokers is difficult to
conduct: brokers do not share prices and often prohibit their business partners from discussing
specific contract details, according to project managers interviewed in Nicaragua (pers. comm.,
January 5-6, 2009). There are clearly profits to be made: by 2005 the World Bank anticipated its
commissions from brokering carbon trades could be approximately $100 million dollars annually
(McMichael, 2009).
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Firms increasingly mainstream strategies to mitigate climate change into daily operations.
As this process increases, many businesses actively lobby individually and/or by sector to
influence climate policy in ways that assist their bottom line (Haigh, 2008). This type of selfinterested or profit-motivated thinking extends beyond the private sector. Giddens (2009)
identifies a tendency for everyone from politicians to the general public to select particular
angles from broader climate change debates to advance their prior political or economic agenda,
instead of viewing the potentially repercussions of global environmental change holistically or
objectively.
Everyone wants a percentage of the profit from carbon markets, including environmental
organizations. Representatives of the major international environmental groups noted that carbon
markets provide an economic opportunity, stating:
For a number of years conservation organizations have been lamenting the decline in
available funding. Carbon funds, however, are growing at a phenomenal rate, and offer
the potential to make up some of the shortfall (Roe, Reid, Vaughan, Brickell, & Elliott,
2007, p. 1).
Clearly not all funds from carbon sales will go directly to offsetting GHG emissions. Regulators
and participants in these markets need to decide what percentage they are comfortable assigning
to brokers, consultants, verifiers, and promoters. These earnings remain largely in middle and
high income countries where trading and consulting operations are consolidated. Meanwhile, the
high transaction costs for CDM verification, some of which is paid to intermediaries offering
specialized services, are discouraging small-scale and community-based projects in developing
countries with limited financial capital from pursuing verification in spite of the potential of
earning carbon credits (Lokey, 2009).
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A Mitigation Research Framework
Mitigation projects targeting low-cost reductions may multiply existing and new humanenvironment risks, with the highest costs often felt among vulnerable social groups. Applying a
double exposure framework to climate change mitigation fits squarely with the research
trajectory Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) propose, but it is an extension of most scholarly work
concerning climate change exposures as studies have tended to focus on adaptation (for example,
O‘Brien et al., 2004; Thomas and Twyman, 2005; Leichenko and O‘Brien 2002, 2008).
Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) suggest that double exposure would fit in the case of biofuels. We
suggest broader application is possible, although we identify a potential analytical weakness.
While we support attention to interrelations between global climate change and economic
change, we also suggest mitigation researchers should seek early on to identify the influence of
politics and the roles of multi-scale political actors given the disputed nature of climate
governance in multiple arenas (Harriss-White, 2008; Giddens, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010;
Ribot, 2010).
Although O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) and Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) suggest that
there can be ‗winners‘ as well as ‗losers‘ from double exposures, they never identify or expand
upon the specific attributes of so-called ‗double winners.‘ Nonetheless, double exposure presents
itself as a productive and helpful lens to use to examine climate change mitigation because it
shows connections between social sectors that benefit and other sectors that are harmed. Worth
(2009, p.5-6) breaks key problems in climate change mitigation down into what she calls the
‗triple injustices:‘ (1) climate change is hitting the poor first and worst; (2) those most affected
did not cause it and are powerless to stop it; and (3) the polluters are not paying. If the double
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exposure framework helps demonstrate how injustices such as these are interconnected, it makes
important theoretical and practical contributions.

Mitigation and Multiple Exposures
We do not suggest that all GHG emission exchanges are problematic or unjust; however,
exploitative and/or fraudulent trade has serious repercussions, including: (1) limitations to
sustainable development, (2) threats to social and distributive justice, and (3) constraints to
actual reductions in GHG emissions. It has been shown that perverse incentives in poorly
designed policies can increase emissions or counterbalance effective reductions (Lohmann, 2005,
2006; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009). Plants created to produce the potent GHG called HFC-23
are the most popular example. Although not found in Latin America, HFC-23 cases bloated the
entire CDM system. Defining a fair method to value HFC-23 emission credits remains a point of
contention. Perverse incentives in carbon markets waste resources: time and energy utilized to
restrict HFC-23 production could have been spent reducing emissions from other sources.
There are various accuracy concerns in voluntary GHG markets: for example, news
reports discuss cases of institutions reselling or double counting credits. Measurement is
challenging in many environmental service markets, as Robertson (2007) describes in US
wetland mitigation banking. While even national exchanges are complex, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) attempts to work at a vast spatial scale
when certifying thousands of transnational trades. Establishing a system of this scale and scope
is an enormous challenge. As evidence that the UNFCCC system continues to have weak spots,
large verification agencies working under the CDM have lost official privileges after deficiencies
were found in their verification and book-keeping practices. The UNFCCC is challenged to
address criticisms that it is slow to certify emissions reductions while at the same time assuring
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sufficient oversight so that self-interested actors are not able to cheat the system, and that highly
diverse cases are each treated fairly. As it stands, the CDM lacks due process safeguards (von
Unger and Streck, 2009). However, the UNFCCC structure is constantly evolving--the complex
architecture of the institution means processes require substantial time. There are still many
kinks to work out, so to speak. The UNFCCC attempts to regulate transparency in CDM
emissions reductions, but it is plagued by questions of fairness, particularly in terms of
governance on the part of the Executive Board (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Millar and Wilder,
2009).
Sustainable development was supposed to be an integral part of the Kyoto Protocol.
Sustainability was not achieved in any of the seventeen CDM projects Sutter and Parreño (2007)
assessed in terms of rates of local employment, air quality, and distribution of Certified
Emissions Reductions (CERs). Concerns about sustainability in carbon mitigation programs
were also expressed in Olsen (2007) and Anderson (2009), among others. Olsen (2007)
concludes that left to market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable
development. In part, issues arise because it remains unclear in the climate regime how to
balance public goods with private rights (Werksman, 2008).
Globally, there have been higher climate change costs among low income countries
(Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006) and populations (Ribot, 2010). Nevertheless, a focus of
negotiators from powerful countries has been to assure cheap carbon offsets for polluters in the
industrialized world (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Peck, 2008). Within global environmental
service markets, the search for inexpensive offsets reinforces inequity in the trading structure and
who it benefits (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009). It is often possible to identify trade-offs between
carbon storage potential and resources for local subsistence (Chandani, 2007; Chhatrea and
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Agrawal, 2010). In some cases, GHG mitigation projects have led to restricted resource local
access to resources (Lohmann, 2006; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Mate and Ghosh, 2009) or
may disadvantage local knowledge (Lohmann, 2008). Another pattern is poor distribution of
carbon market earnings to local communities. Some CDM projects in Latin America have been
shown to disproportionately benefit national elites and foreigners (Lohmann, 2006; Lokey,
2009). These processes show that there can be ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ from the same situation at
a national level concurrent to international inequities. For example, projects can become
dependent on foreign expertise or equipment (Lokey, 2009). Policies and programs that are not
created to fit a particular domestic situation may harm national capacity (Comim, 2008). Yet
projects that create these negative impacts are often still implemented because they bring
benefits to certain sectors of society. Working with a framework like double exposure helps to
demonstrate that ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ are connected.
The overall oversight of ecological and social sustainability of many CDM projects
remains unsatisfactory (Lohmann, 2006; Olsen, 2007; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). There is a large
and growing literature on social injustice in carbon markets (Baldwin, 2009; Gilbertson and
Reyes, 2009; Mate and Ghosh, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). In some instances
carbon trade creates new ecological and social problems, and these trade-offs generally remain
poorly analyzed (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Peck, 2009). With more than 2,000 CDM projects
verified, there is extensive offsetting experience to learn from. Meanwhile, an international
climate justice movement is growing due to lack of attention to community development and
ecological integrity in many mitigation projects (Lohmann 2006; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009;
Gudnydas, 2009).
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Multi-scale Climate Policy Remains Incomplete
While grassroots organizations clamor for non-market solutions to climate change in
many countries of the world, most policy analysts expect carbon trade to continue as the
dominant mitigation paradigm. There are a growing number of certification standards for carbon
credits (e.g., the Gold Standard, the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard, etc.). These
provide targets, such as integral community development, participation, waste reduction, workers
rights, etc., that emerged from the recognition of shortfalls in early GHG mitigation projects.
Certification of standards adds to the expense of verifiable carbon offsets, but it creates oversight
mechanisms for social and environmental factors that are frequently overlooked in conventional
regulatory and voluntary trading schemes.
Carbon trade, according to the Kyoto Protocol, was supposed to reduce the development
gap between industrial nations and the rest of the world. Early experiences have fallen short of
Kyoto‘s objectives. However, recommendations to improve governance and equity in the climate
regime abound (e.g., Ackerman, 2008; Burkett, 2008; Brohé, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009; Millar and
Wilder, 2009; von Unger and Streck, 2009; Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Quirion, 2010; White,
Hatcher, Khare, Liddle, Molnar, & Sunderlin, 2010). After failure to reach agreement for post2012 climate policy in Copenhagen in December of 2009, tensions between countries and among
groups of countries remain high (Doelle, 2010; Zelljadt, 2010). The unwillingness of US
legislators to enact national climate policy receives international criticism as policymakers
prepare for the next round of UNFCCC negotiations in December of 2010.
The time for enabling climate justice is short, but the potential for creativity, reflexive
justice and, socially inclusive orientations to climate change responses are wide open
(Lotz-Sisitka, 2010, p. 87).
Addressing climate change is the responsibility of more than just state institutions
(Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Rahm 2010). In particular, educators need to analyze and discuss
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climate injustices, particularly given our urgent need to transition to a low carbon economy and
to govern the climate in an inclusive manner (Lotz-Sisitka, 2010). Further, climate change
governance needs to be a high priority on the global research agenda. Many knowledge gaps
concerning GHG emission mitigation currently exist in natural and social sciences alike.
However, tendencies among policy makers and researchers to offer simplistic, normative
statements arguing climate change should be at the top of the agenda should be cautioned since
sustainable development is integral and multi-faceted (Christoplos, 2010). Holistic,
interdisciplinary analysis of proposed solutions is clearly necessary to understand trade-offs and
achieve proactive, effective, and equitable climate policy. There is great potential for research
highlighting connections between double winners and double losers, but associated risks are
presented below.

Conclusion
In this paper we set out to test the utility of double exposure as a concept for researching
climate change and hazards in the Americas. Drawing on published research and four case
studies of our own, we have demonstrated that looking for the intersections between
globalization and global environmental change is in fact productive. In all of our cases, we found
overlaps between these often related global change processes. But the outcomes of the
interaction between the two processes were not consistent across cases. In the Bocas del Toro
energy sector, we saw how efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change in fact exacerbated
the human rights abuses perpetuated under the logic of globalization. In Jamaica, we saw the
same populations who were vulnerable to the increasing risk of infectious disease due to climate
change were doubly at risk due to social marginalization reinforced by globalization. These
different interactions—the ability to demonstrate double winners, double losers, and cases where
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efforts to address one global change practice (perhaps unwittingly) expand inequity—are a
powerful contribution to research on climate change and hazards because they sensitize us as
researchers to system impacts that may otherwise go unnoticed. Moreover, the simultaneous
attention to these two processes approximates the manner in which people actually manage risks
in their communities. When making policy decisions about climate change and hazards, double
exposure provides a more nuanced view that focusing on singular impacts or flows within
mitigation and adaptation.
Our cases demonstrate that, as a heuristic for case study analysis, double exposure can be
used in multiple sectors, including health and energy. Our cases add to arguments of Leichenko
and O‘Brien (2008) that double exposure can be applied to diverse situations. That said, we did
find that applying double exposure as a method for analysis was less straightforward as we
expanded the scale of our analysis. Particularly at the transnational scale it became difficult to
determine the interacting impacts between globalization and climate change. At this scale, we
doubt the utility of mapping the double exposure as was successfully done on the community
level in O‘Brien and Leichinko (2004).
The transnational case study of mitigation windfalls also highlighted an important tension
between double winners and double losers. We started the fourth case study discussing how
some companies and intermediaries are making and stand to make large profits from carbon
trading. These entities are winners because of global environmental change, and they are also
winners in the flow of global capital. Yet the same case study points to the simultaneous double
losers: the communities, small companies, and individuals who lose autonomy over natural
resources while others make profits. The framework of double exposures reveals different
winners and losers in the same scenario. This is, of course, not surprising as far as winners often
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mean that someone may be losing out. Our concern is that the existence of double winners in
analysis and research may legitimize and justify action (in this case transnational carbon trading
schemes) despite the double losers. We fear that policy analysis at various levels (local, regional,
national, transnational) relies on cost-benefit analysis that does not sufficiently value ‗losers‘ nor
prioritize equity when there is profit to be made. We worry that the ability to highlight the
positives surrounding double winners—or even partial winners—may overshadow double losers,
even though the concept is designed to highlight equity issues. Other academic traditions, such as
political economy and political ecology, may be used to minimize this shortfall and demonstrate
how the trajectories are connected with windfalls for a small few leading to deprivation for
others. Nevertheless, we remain cautious of how double exposure analysis might be manipulated
or twisted by policy makers.
O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) outline issues of equity by directly highlighting
differences in gender, nationality, class, etc. of double exposure processes. Nevertheless, Castree
(2010) criticizes Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) for ethical superficiality because they present
double winners as if the category is ethically neutral. Nearly every development situation will
likely involve trade-offs with moral consequences. Examples of trade-offs were presented in all
four case studies above: issues of social equity are directly relevant in whether a Jamaican has
adequate health care, an Argentinean farmer gets sufficient water, or Panamanian indigenous
villages are relocated to produce hydroelectric energy. Moreover, the Jamaican case suggested
that not prioritizing health care in light of rising sea-levels was itself a trade-off with associated
ethical concerns. Our cases demonstrate important ethical implications that are not clearly
brought into focus by the double exposure framework.
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Castree (2010) uses his review of Leichenko and O‘Brien‘s (2008) book to encourage
geographers and the academic community more broadly to directly address the ethically
dimension of the topics we research. This argument is reminiscent of Liberation Ecologies (Peet
and Watts, 1996/2006) and several other classic political ecology works. Political ecologists tend
to keep issues of power, access, and distribution central to their analysis, whether related to
issues of air and water pollution or natural resource management (Bryant, 1998; Peet and Watts,
1996/2006). Many times, this involves spelling out the role of global development actors. For
example, international finance institutions (IFIs) are highly involved in promoting carbon
markets, while also standing to benefit from them. Access to carbon finance provides power to
carbon investors and lenders. These implications need to be extensively researched and defined
to promote transparency and public access to information. In contrast, processes of corporate
lobbying to influence the global climate regime are poorly understood among the general public.
Similarly, the responsibility of nation-states remains unclear, but states clearly remain strong
actors in determining or blocking global responses, as well as in defining domestic adaptation
and mitigation. The role of the state was important in each of the four case studies treated in this
paper and thus we suggest it needs to be addressed directly and, when appropriate, critically.
Even in the US, where the federal government has failed to play a leadership role, there have
been decentralized responses at regional, state, and local governance scales (Bryne, Hughes,
Rickerson, & Kurdgelashvili, 2007). Nonetheless, policy analysts are concerned with the
seemingly upward shifts in governance and decision-making scales linked to climate policy. For
example, the institutional architecture of GHG trade policy in the forest carbon sector in
particular could create the potential for a recentralization of natural resource management after
decades of movement towards decentralization and community engagement (Phelps, Webb, &
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Agrawal, 2010). Governance shifts linked to climate policy need to be analyzed in greater detail
within extensive cross-national and multi-scale research sensitive to issues of social justice and
community development.
We recommend complementary bodies of literature to complement double exposure
analysis. The centrality of scale and power issues, of which the ones mentioned above are only a
small selection, suggests drawing from additional political ecology literature could be beneficial
(e.g., Peet and Watts, 1996; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter & Wangari, 1996; Swyngedouw, 1997,
2004; Blaikie, 1999; Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown & Svarstad, 2001; Zimmerer and Bassett,
2003; Robbins, 2004; etc.). Political ecology provides an instrumental framework for the study
of multi-scale, nature-society interactions that change over time (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003).
Political ecologists have successfully analyzed multiple scales without losing sight of the local
(e.g., Swyngedouw, 1997, 2004). This detailed attention to scale and scope is necessary to avoid
mistakes during climate change adaptation and mitigation. Cutting-edge analysis of climate
change policy is imperative to improve current practices. The work of environmental geopolitical
theorists, such as Sletto (2003) and Dalby (2003, 2004), could also support both domestic and
foreign policy analysis of complex interactions in the realm of environmental policy.
In an effort to help refine the conceptualization and methodological application of
double exposure, we offer the following limitations of double exposure as a research method.
These limitations are suggested in the spirit of friendly criticism in the hopes we can contribute
to refining this valuable climate change research approach.
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Limitations
Researchers have identified a number of potential limitations to the double exposure
research method (e.g., O‘Brien et al., 2004; Castree, 2010; Christoplos, 2010). We draw from
and build upon these critiques as a means to encourage ongoing engagement with double
exposure.
Method. As noted in the literature review, Leichinko and O‘Brien (2008) present double
exposures as a conceptual framework for study, but do not detail a precise method for applying
this framework in academic analysis. In a book review, Bailey (2009) notes: ―The double
exposure framework may strike some readers as very broad and lacking some analytical
precision, but I would argue that this is necessary to capture the essence and plasticity of
interactions between these two sets of forces‖ (p. 243). Although we are sympathetic to the
argument that the double exposures framework is necessarily broad, the lack of analytical
precision remains a drawback, particularly for scholars other than Leichinko and O‘Brien using
and contributing to the approach.
As one additional limitation, several central concepts (e.g., resilience, vulnerability) and
discourses used by natural scientists to understand global environmental change are not
universally accepted in the social sciences. Although it is clearly necessary to bridge the natural
and social sciences and to work across disciplines, it is hard to integrate diverse discourses as
they build from highly different epistemic frameworks. Klein (2009) notes related disjuncture
between definitions of concepts like vulnerability among academics and development
practitioners, as well as legal ambiguity in the usage of such concepts by policy makers.
Scale. As we note above, at the level of transnational scale application the researcher
loses the fine-grained, place-based examples that more clearly show cause-effect relationships
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between global environmental change and globalization (Hidayat & Stuhl, 2010). This poses
both theoretical and methodological challenges. In terms of theory-building, regional scale
analysis is more likely to use ―double exposures‖ as a general concern with the overlapping
impacts of globalization and climate change. Although this approach make prove useful for
exploring individual case studies, it could end up undermining efforts to formalize double
exposures as a theory about the causal relationship between the global change processes since
researchers would be making a more general use of the concept as a heuristic device. In terms of
method, mapping double exposures at intermediary and macro scales seems daunting due to
availability of appropriate data. Activities and ―flows‖ are changing too rapidly to be
satisfactorily categorized and mapped (Malone, 2002). This is particularly true at macro scales,
such as our fourth case study.
Mapping. Even moving away from the particular challenges of mapping at a macrolevel, mapping double exposures poses important challenges that have yet to be fully resolved.
As O‘Brien et al. (2004) point out, maps can imply abrupt boundaries where fuzzy boundaries
are more appropriate. This is particularly true for dynamic processes like vulnerability.
Determining special representations of key indicators that determine local vulnerability (e.g.
social capital, institutional relationships, etc.) remains a challenge (Eakin and Luers, 2006). Our
case studies do not tackle the challenge of mapping in practice. Nonetheless, even in the case of
Jamaica where economic, health, and environmental data exists at a manageable scale, actually
mapping the vulnerability isn‘t straightforward or obvious. Mapping the interaction between the
dynamic processes of global environmental change and globalization seems daunting even at the
local level—despite O‘Brien et al. (2004) demonstrating that it can be done. One concern with
regional, meso-, or macro- scale applications, is that specific impacts from positive or negative
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feedback loops can be identified more easily in particular communities or ecosystems. We note
particular challenges for researchers who wish to map vulnerabilities linked to double exposures.
Boundaries would likely be dynamic, porous, and heterogeneous over time and space. The nature
of risk also changes over time (Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010).
Dynamics unknown. This discussion of the interactions between globalization and global
environmental change points to a conceptual limitation inherent in the call to consider both
processes simultaneously: is it possible to tease out the dynamics of interacting effects? In some
of our cases, such as the proposed dam project in Bocas del Toro, it appears obvious that an
attempt to mitigate the impacts of climate change will in fact hurt indigenous groups, although
there are benefits for Panamanian society at large. The interaction between globalization and
climate change is evident since the interaction centers around the proposed dam project justified
by climate change and to feed increasing energy demand from Panama‘s rapidly expanding
economy. Similarly, the economic impacts of globalization in the Mendoza region of Argentina
occurred temporally before the some of the changes in water availability. Yet in Jamaica, the
interactions between globalization and climate change are less clear because this is an on-going,
seasonal problem that is getting worse due to global environmental changes. This case shows
that it is productive to discuss how the two global change processes increase the vulnerability of
particular groups; the dual attention to globalization and global environmental change is a
powerful combination. Yet determining the nature of interaction effects is less straightforward.
As Eakin and Luers (2006) observe, ―O‘Brien et al.‘s model of double exposure as applied to
India (72)… is attractive in that it captures visually the idea of overlapping stressors on a
population, yet the nature of the interaction, the relative importance of distinct stressors for
particular systems at any given time, and the possible nonlinear responses of a system to multiple
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stressors remain elusive‖ (p. 379-380). The precise dynamics of double exposure interactions
are particularly important should double exposures be developed as causal argument, but the
framework is not best designed to discuss how these exposures are related. ―The framework
implies a linear sequence and may obscure the relationships and feedbacks among processes,
contexts, exposure units, responses, and outcomes: while the framework may be constructed for
the reader to comprehend the concept of double exposures, it undermines the discussion of the
relatedness of double exposures‖ (Hidayat and Stuh, 2010, p. 87).
Oversimplification. Given the limitations above that point to the challenges in capturing
the dynamics of double exposures, it may seem unfair to also call double exposures prone to
oversimplification. Yet ―the concept of double exposure may hide the complexity of the range of
factors that hide under the multiple levels and institutions within the processes of global
environmental change and globalization‖ (Christoplos, 2010, n.p.). Double exposure as defined
and utilized currently does not sufficiently portray or clarify the interplay between governance
scales and among political agents. While we expect individual researchers will uncover and
communicate these important factors, we would encourage greater clarification at the onset given
their central importance in several of the case studies and in much of the literature reviewed in
this work.
Double exposure as currently envisioned as a research framework is so broad it could
encompass most current development processes in Latin America. The overarching, conceptually
inclusive of the double exposure framework could signify that important factors receive less
attention than they deserve. For example, according to Castree (2010), the topic of equity,
although identified as of central importance, comes across as being glossed over in Leichinko
and O‘Brien (2008).
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Multiple exposures rather than double exposures. Even the broad categories of
globalization and global environmental change do not necessarily capture all of the risks to
which a community is vulnerable nor all of the factors that might be included in risk analysis.
For example, natural hazards like earthquakes (Christoplos, 2010) are not related to global
environmental change, yet they pose important risks to certain communities. If the goal of
research is to fully assess vulnerability, adaptability, or mitigation efforts, double exposures may
be too limited of a lens.
There is clearly complexity in the types and degrees of exposure. For example, case study
three suggested the need to pay specific attention to human rights and to respect international
norms for the protection of Indigenous Peoples‘ rights, including land tenure. Although while we
mention that the double exposure framework has not shed light on how to weigh development
trade-offs against each other, existing analytical frameworks have not been able to do that either.
While double exposure has a number of strengths, there is clearly a need to continue to combine
this research literature with other traditions, including political economy and political ecology.
Case study four in particular suggested likely benefit from drawing on political ecology due to
the tradition of using this framework to highlight scalar and power issues in dynamic, complex
nature-society interactions.
Anthropogenic climate change and carbon markets create emerging human-environment
interactions that bridge industrial and developing countries in intense and complicated ways.
There are vast opportunities for timely research on climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Natural and social scientists have important roles to play in finding sustainable pathways that
contribute to the reduction of social and ecological risks associated with climate change and
support social justice.
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